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ABSTRACT
Wheeler, David C ., M.A., December, 1976
Individual Choice as a Functi
Director:

Interpersonal Communication

Information Processing (117 pp.)

Duane D. Pettersen

In an attempt to study the effects of various levels of Informa
tion Processing on risky choice decisions, this study investigated
the variated responses of four levels of Information Processing
(high, medium high, medium low and low) in a ranking and choice
paradigm. Subjects were placed into Information Processing (IP )
quartiles according to th e ir score on the Repertory Role Test
(a low score placing an individual in the high IP q u a rtile , a high
score in the low IP q u a rtile ). The subjects ranked two sets of
options according to the perceived riskiness of the options for
the subject. The subject selected one option from each of the
sets which they would prefer i f they were in the hypothetical
situation stated in the options. The variance in the riskiness of
the choices or in the rankings would not warrant rejection of the
null hypotheses. The study found a trend suggesting differences
between the combined riskiness of the choices made by the high and
low Information Processing subjects and the combined riskiness
of the choices made by the medium high and medium low Information
Processing subjects. A sim ilar trend was also found on the relevancy
scales of the MORS and the CRRS instruments. The trends indicated
that the high and low Information Processors made more cautious
choices and rated the options as less relevant than did the medium
high and medium low Information Processors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There is seldom a day passes without an individual having to
make a choice of some kind.

These choice situations are usually

f ille d with a plethora o f options.

Through some process the human

organism sorts through the options and reaches some decision.

The

interesting event to be observed is the fa c t that d iffe re n t in 
dividuals reach d iffe re n t fin a l choices, even though they have
apparently received the same information.

This is apparently why

we have p o litic a l parties, d iffe re n t religious organizations,
d iffe re n t service clubs and other diverse means of attaining what,
on the surface, appear to be the identical p o litic a l, relig iou s,
#

social or humanitarian goals.
From the above observation three assumptions seem to be relevant
considering human decision making or choice resolution.

These

assumptions have been taken from David W. Kale (1975) and modified
to conform with the language and intent of this study.
Assumption #1:

Each individual builds for himself a
cognitive representation of what the
world is lik e and this serves to
organize and give meaning to his
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experiences and the value of those
experiences in future choice resolutions.
This cognitive representation is a most accurate schema of
an individual's psychological make-up.

I t is also probably the

best predictor of how an individual w ill behave in a given set of
circumstances.

This schema is viewed by M ille r , Galanter and

Pribram (1960) as. a mediator in the perception of the world.
Any correlation between stimulus and response
must be mediated by an organized representation of
the environment, a system of concepts and relations
within which the organism is located, (p. 7)
In essence this schema is an internal r e a lity which the
individual has put together to assist him in coping and adapting
to the environment in which he is located.
Assumption #2:

The input to a particu lar individual's
cognitive system is d ire c tly related
to its output in certain predictable
and describable ways.

This assumption deals with the idea that i t is possible to
determine the behavior associated with certain input to a system
by dealing with the strategies that a system w ill employ in the
collection and management of input.

More s p e c ific a lly , the

strategies used by the system w ill be d ire c tly re lia n t on the
internal schema of the individual.

Thus, the internal schema of
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the world not only affects the output strategies but the input
strategies as w ell.

This is what is put forth by Schroder, Driver

and Streufert (1969) when they defined information processing as
"the nature and interdependence of conceptual rules available fo r
organizing dimensional values."

More simply put, when a person

is presented information, he categorizes that information according
to his own internal set of rules or values and processes that in 
formation to f i t with his schema of his world.
Assumption #3:

The most important variable in
understanding human information process
may be the schema or structural system
within which that information is being
processed.

This assumption centers on the notion of the input content
as not being as important as the process i t goes through in te r
nally within the individual.
this point.

A distinction must be made clear at

There are two ways of looking at input variables.

The f i r s t is the content or the surface features of the input.
The second is the way in which the input is processed through the
individual's schema of the environment.

I t is more simply the

distinction between what is being processed and how i t is processed.
These assumptions suggest the idea that each individual has
certain strategies fo r reaching a decision in processing information.

Thus, one might surmise that variance within a research paradigm
may be accounted fo r by differences in the structures or schemas
used by individual subjects in the research environment.
Based on these assumptions, Kale provides a three stage
model used by individuals in processing information.

An individual

f i r s t pulls from his environment the information which is of
relevance.

This might be termed selective perception of the world.

Secondly, the individual d iffe re n tia te s the selected information
into categories available from his schema of the world.

I f the

information does not f i t into a present category, he can eith er
discard the input, develop a new category, or d is to rt the informa
tion to f i t a given category.

The fin a l stage of the process is the

judgment of the value of the input.

This stage includes the when,

where, why, and how of the use of the processed information.
All three of the above stages are influenced or directed by
the internal schema the individual has of his world.

In addition

to the three stages there is an environmental factor which can a ffe c t
the processing of information.

This factor is the complexity/

sim p licity of the environment.

The e ffe c t of the environment can be

due to the environment being so scarce in input elements that there
is l i t t l e or no relevant input fo r the individual.

This could cause

a withdrawal by the individual from the environment, i . e . , elderly
people in the s te r ile environment of a rest home.

The other extreme

of environmental input is that the environment is so complex that
the individual's perceptive, d iffe re n tia tin g and judgment capacities
are overpowered rendering the individual unable to process the input.
This could also cause a withdrawal from the environment un til coping
powers return, or create a complete avoidance of the specific en
vironment, i . e . , an individual who has taken an hallucinogenic drug,
or a student unable to progress in a given academic fie ld .
In the present study, consideration of how individuals process
given input from the environment is sp ec ific ally related to the
phenomenon of risk and perceptions of risk in an experimental
paradigm.

In the present study Information Processing w ill be re- .

lated to the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire paradigm of choice s h ift.
The nature of risk and perceptions of risk are subjective in nature,
thus an investigation into the effects of various levels of informa
tion processing upon risk decisions appears to be relevant.
The subjective nature of risk in the choice s h ift paradigm is
supported by recent studies in the area using the standard Choice
Dilemma Questionnaires (CDQ) paradigm (Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein,
M ille r, Vinokur, Katz and Crowley, 1971).

"Subjective expected

u t ilit y " of the decision and its outcome was found to be important
in both of these studies.

Burnstein e t a l. states sp ec ific ally

the choice observed was epiphenomenal, i . e . , the choice s h ift was
a d irect result of a change or reprocessing of the subjective expected
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u t i l i t y o f the decision to be made within the CDQ item.

The in 

dividual 's personal schema of the world had been re-ordered, thus
the decision was changed and the choice s h ift occurred.
The next chapter consists of three sections.
includes a review of the choice s h ift lite ra tu re .

The f ir s t section
The second section

narrows the scope of the study to individual effects on choice
resolutions.

The third section provides an explanation of informa

tion processing and some of its possible implications fo r choice
resolutions.

CHAPTER I I
REVIEWS OF LITERATURE
Review of Choice S h ift Literature
The bulk of the choice s h ift research has been based onthe
use of the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) paradigm.

The CDQ

paradigm uses a series of hypothetical situations in which the
central character is presented with a possibly risky choice.

The

subject is asked to choose the odds of success required before the
subject would advise the central character to take the risky choice.
The odds range from 1 chance out of ten of success (risky) to under
no conditions should the central character take the risk (cautious),
The odds scale consists of 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 chances out of 10 and no
chance for success i f the choice is made by the central character.
The CDQ was developed by Kogan and Wallach (1964) to investigate
the phenomenon of individuals making a ris k ie r or more daring choice
when in a group than when making the choice on th e ir own.
From this paradigm three hypotheses have evolved to explain the
phenomenon of choice s h ift from the individual choice to a group con
d ition choice on the CDQ.

The three hypotheses which seem to be

gaining the most support in the lite ra tu re are the diffusion of
resp on sibility, the persuasive arguments and the cultural-values
hypotheses.
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The diffusion of responsibility hypothesis was f ir s t proposed
by Wallach, Kogan and Bern (1964).

The basis of this explanation

is the idea that with shared responsibility a diffusion of the
individual blame for negative consequences occurs.

The decreasing

amount of individual responsibility leads to reduction in the fear
of fa ilu re , a reduction in anxiety level and an increase in the
amount of risky action to which the individuals in the group are
w illin g to be committed.

Although this hypothesis has gained support

from a number of studies (Secord and Backman, 1964; P ru itt and
Teger, 1967; Kogan and Wallach, 1967), there are some recent studies
which put this hypothesis into doubt.
n ific a n t questions in four areas:

These studies raise sig

The e ffe c t of group size on the

amount of choice s h ift, cautions shifts on certain items, effects on
group cohesion on the amount of choice s h ift and the effects of
leadership.
I f the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis is an accurate
explanation of choice s h ift group size should show a positive cor
relation with the amount of risk fo r which a group w ill take
responsibility.

I f increased anonymity is the reason that fear of

fa ilu re is reduced and the anxiety which accompanies that fe a r,
then i t should follow that the bigger the group, the more risk the
group w ill take.

P ru itt and Teger (1967) found ju s t such a res u lt.

They found that there was a sign ifican t difference between a group
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with three members and a group with four or fiv e members.

However,

in a more recent study (Myers and Arenson, 1972) which systematically
controlled for group size, i t was found that there was no sign ifican t
difference in the amount of risk groups of two, three, fiv e or
seven members would take.

I f group size does not a ffec t the amount

of risk a group w ill undertake, then a prime assumption of the d if 
fusion of responsibility hypothesis is in doubt.

This is p artic u la rly

sign ifican t when i t is considered that both studies used the same
CDQ items.
One explanation of the Myers and Arenson (1972) results could
be that the groups were too a r t i f i c i a l , since the subjects were
randomly assigned to a group size condition.

I t would then be sur

mised that the individuals in the groups did not have the tru st
needed in the group to make the bigger groups ris k ie r than the smaller
groups.

The problem with this explanation is the effe ct that co

hesion has on group choice s h ift.

Dion, M ille r, and Magnan (1971)

found the more cohesion in the group, the less risky the s h ift.

This

was explained by the writers suggesting that a ffe ctive bonds pre
vented the individuals from wanting the others in the group to share
in any negative consequences of the decision, or having the others in
the group becoming the cause of the fa ilu re in the perception of
others or of s e lf.
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The area of cautious shifts in group decisions does not seem
to support the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis.

Cartwright

(1971), Blank (1968), Myers and Bishop (1971), and Moscovici and
Zavalloni (1968) a ll found a consistently cautious s h ift on certain
items on the CDQ.

The diffusion of responsibility hypothesis does

not allow or explain a s h ift in the cautious direction. The s h ift
in these studies promotes the idea that cautious s h ift may be due to
the same process in the group as risky s h ift.

The basis fo r this

notion is the fact that the same items across studies were found to
have a consistently cautious s h ift, ju s t as certain items con
s isten tly evoked a risky s h ift.

This finding furth er suggests that

there may have been some unexpected subjective elements in the
situations or the experimental condition which caused this consistency.
There was quite possibly something the subjects consistently used
on the various items which accounts for this consistency.
The second major problem with the diffusion of responsibility
hypothesis is the e ffe c t of leadership on the group decision.
S p e c ific a lly , the leader persuades the individuals in the group to
take a ris k ie r or more cautious position (Boulanger and Fischer,
1971).

In th e ir study, an emergent leader from a group's f ir s t

discussion was asked prior to a second discussion to take a risky
position, cautious position or neutral position.

I t was found that

the leader could move the group decision in a given direction.

The
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diffusion of responsibility hypothesis does not account fo r this
because the decision is u n ilateral rather than m u ltila te ra l in the
group's acceptance of the consequences of the decision.
There are two studies in support of the. persuasion hypothesis
(Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Marquis, 1962).

This hypothesis stated

that i f there were no predominant leader, there would be no s h ift.
Hoyt and Stoner (1968) used management trainees and graduate
students in business administration in an attempt to n u llify the
e ffe c t of leader riskiness and persuasion.

They found that the group

decision was s ig n ific a n tly ris k ie r than the mean of the individual
decisions.

According to the theory, these individuals would be con

s is te n tly more risky in th e ir in it ia l choices than would the average
randomized group, thus less affected by a persuasive leader's risky
arguments.
In the second study on the e ffe c t of leader influence in the
group (Boulanger and Fischer, 1971), i t was found that the leader
did have a s ig n ifican t e ffe c t on the group's decision, although the
e ffe c t was sho rt-lived .

The e ffe c t of the leader lasted only while

the person was in that p artic u lar group.

The cautious leaders and

the neutral position'leaders both produced cautious shifts in the
group decision.

The cautious leader produced a s ig n ific a n tly greater

cautious s h ift than did the neutral leader.

The individual cautious

position held through a post group individual decision.

The risky

•leader did produce a risky s h ift in the group decision, but the
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e ffe c t was transitory.

When the member of the risky leader group

responded in a post group individual decision, the members reverted
to th e ir in it ia l cautious responses.

Thus, the leader's e ffect

on long-term commitment to risk is in doubt.
Another problem with the persuasive leader hypothesis is that
i t assumes that the leader is the individual in the group who takes
the ris k ie s t stance.

There is no consistent support fo r this

assertion in the lite ra tu re .

The hypothesis doesn't explain a

choice s h ift on non-risk items (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969).
The persuasive leader hypothesis can account fo r choice s h ift in
only one d ir e c t io n ,- i.e ., in the risky direction.

The unidirectional

nature of this hypothesis leaves too many questions to be answered
fo r this explanation to be a valid explanation of the choice s h ift
phenomenon.
The hypothesis which seems to be gaining the most support from
recent investigations is the cultural-values hypothesis.
pothesis has two underlying propositions.

This hy

The f ir s t is the values

proposition which states that under certain conditions the value of
risky behavior is greater and more salient than the value of cautious
behavior.

This would provide an explanation fo r both cautious and

risky shifts in the situations on the CDQ.

I t would also provide

an explanation for consistently risky and cautious shifts on certain
items on the CDQ.

The second underlying proposition of this hy

pothesis is the relevant information proposition.

This proposition
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states that the values brought out and made salinet through the
group discussion influence the individual to reprocess the informa
tion in lig h t of those values and relevant information of the
choices and values involved.
Investigations of the f ir s t proposition show that risky shifts
on certain items and in certain conditions do occur cross-culturally
between English (Bateson, 1966), Is ra e li (Rim, 1963), Canadian
(Vidmar, 1970), French (Kogan and Doise, 1969), and German (Lamm and
Kogan, 1970) subjects.
s h ift.

These studies found cross-cultural risky

Carlson and Davis (1971) found that Uganda subjects did not

produce evidence of a risky s h ift as did American subjects in sim ilar
task conditions.

This was interpreted as support for the cultural

values proposition.
The cultural values proposition has two interrelated problems.
The f i r s t is the methodological weaknesses of this proposition.

The

researchers in this area (Brown, 1965; Levinger and Schneider, 1969;
Stoner, 1968; Morgan and Aram, 1975) have not put together what values
they need to measure and how these values should be measured.

They

have yet to show that the values that are involved in the influencing
of group decisions are measurable as of now.

The methodological

problems are intertwined with the conceptual problems of this propo
s itio n .

This second problem is in the defining of the values involved
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in the decision and the possible explanation of why those particu lar
values seem to become consistently salien t in some item situations
and not in others.

The values proposition can explain consistent

risk/cautious shifts on certain items, but has problems explaining,
conceptually, inconsistent shifts on other items.

There has been

no conceptual explanation of why cultural values come into play in
a r t i f ic i a l situations of questionable relevance fo r the subjects.
Could i t be that the a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the situation is the factor
which causes the subjects to rely on cultural values, as opposed to
using individual values which may or may not be divergent from the
values of the subject's culture?
considered is:

The question Which needs to be

How much o f the decision is influenced by cultural

values, and how much is influenced by individual values which may
agree or disagree with the culture's values?

How much is the

decision influenced by other factors, i . e . , chance, unrelated con
siderations, psychological s tate, perceived u t i l i t y of the decision,
involvement in the item?

These questions would have to be answered

by investigating the individual perceptions and processing of the in 
formation in each of the questionnaire items.
The relevant information proposition extends the cultural-values
hypothesis to include the exchange of information, and, more im
portantly, the sensitizing of the individuals in the group to the
saliency of certain values and information.

This exchange and ordering
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of the saliency of certain elements influences the individual to
reprocess the item in a d iffe re n t fashion.

This reprocessing in

turn leads to a potential re-ordering with a d iffe re n t perception of
the world and the item involved.

This new and d iffe re n t schema may

influence the differences between individual and group decisions.
The subjective nature of risk is important in lig h t of two
studies (Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein, Moller, Vinokur, Katz, and Crowley,
1971) where the subjective expected u t i l i t y of the decision was seen
as playing an important role in the decision.

The subjective ex

pected u t i l i t y is considered as the sum of a ll the associated rewards
of a decision and a ll the probabilities of success in the particular
decision, or the action i t calls fo r to gain the associated rewards.
For example, i f there are two alternatives to a certain situation
for action and one of the alternatives has a sum of associated rewards
of 8 and a probability of success of 3 out of 10, the subjective
expected u t i l i t y (SEU) of that altern ative is 2.4 (8 x .3 = 2 .4 ).
The other a ltern ative may have an associated rewards value of 12 and
a probability of success of 2.5 out of 10, the SEU of this second
alternative is 3 ( 1 2 x .25 = 3).

The second a ltern ative would be

the more appealing of the two alternatives.
I t must be remembered that the two elements of the SEU are very
subjective in th e ir nature.
for that individual.

The associated rewards are the rewards

The rewards may include perceived honor, control,
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success, acceptance or other rewards which may or may not be a r
ticulated or consciously formulated.

In any case they influence a

decision in conjunction with the individual's perceived probability
of success in the decision of attaining the perceived associated
rewards.
In lig h t of the concept of subjective expected u t i l i t y , the
question arises as to whether subjects view the rewards and proba
b ilit ie s of success in a situation s ig n ific a n tly d iffe re n t and
process the available information d iffe r e n tia lly .
answer would be yes.

In tu itiv e ly , the

I t is apparent that individual perceptions and

the e ffe c t of those individual perceptions need to be investigated.
The next section of this paper w ill investigate the research and
findings in the area of individual decision making and some of the
factors influencing the ways persons make decisions.
Individual Choice Effects
Lerner (1965) investigated individual perceptions of a particu lar
situation to take note of the variance of the individual explanations
given fo r the situation.

The situation involved two workers.

One

of the workers was rewarded with a sum of money through no e ffo rt or
s k ill on his part.

The subjects evaluated the rewarded worker as

more capable than the unrewarded worker.

This evaluation occurred in

spite of the fa c t that the worker was rewarded fo rtu ito u sly.

In a
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study by Lerner and Simons (1966), subjects witnessed a fellow subject
receive presumably severe shocks fo r making minor errors in a learning
task.

The researchers found that the subjects rejected and de

valued the apparently suffering victim to , in some way, make the
negative consequences seem deserved by the individual.

This was

apparently an e ffo rt by the subjects to put things in a correct
perspective, since they could do nothing to a lle v ia te th e ir peer's
suffering.

The correct perspective is that of a "Just World".

That is to say that only bad things happen to bad people and good
things always happen to good people.

This hypothesis has received

considerable support (Landy and Aronson, 1967; Lerner and Mathews,
1967; Rubin and Peplau, 1973; Shaw and Sklonik, 1971; Simmons and
P ilia v in , 1972; Walster, 1966).

As Lee (1971) put i t , " I f our hero

did not win (at poker) our estimate of him would decrease even though
objectively we have to rea lize that getting four kings had nothing
to do with any of his q u a litie s ." (p. 66)
With the Just World hypothesis in mind, le t us examine the CDQ
and see i f this perception of the world could have a bearing on the
responses by the subject.

F irs t i t must be realized that individuals

have negative and positive prejudices toward certain occupations and
social or status positions.

I f the subjects consider a football

player in a negative perspective, i t is possible in the item on the
CDQ which deals with the. decision a football player has to make to
win or lose the game that the subject would make a ris k ie r than
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average choice.

The choice stemmed not from the situation in the

item, rather the subject's perception that i f the main character
fa ile d i t was a deserved payment fo r playing "Mr. Big".

Thus the

choice made had l i t t l e to do with the s itu atio n , rather i t was in 
fluenced by a prejudice of a certain role position.
The same reasoning could hold in the positive direction.

In

the item on the CDQ concerning a successful businessman who is con
sidering running for Congress on a minority party tic k e t, a subject
may look at the item and evaluate i t in the following manner:

any

minority party is the "good guys", the good guys always win.

Even

i f they don't win the election, they w ill have been heard, thus the
businessman should run no matter i f his chances of winning are only
1 chance out of 10.

This would be interpreted as a risky decision,

although the level of risk had l i t t l e to do with the decision.

All

of the twelve items on the CDQ could be processed or evaluated on
c rite ria other than the level of risk involved in the a lte rn a tiv e .
That is to say that a personal prejudice of the subject could sig
n ific a n tly a ffe c t the reason for the decision and the decision its e lf .
These two examples show the e ffe c t of SEU on the particu lar items of
the CDQ being used.

This subjective effe ct is beyond the control of

the experimenter, although the experimenter using the CDQ assumes that
the subjects are going to process the items in a rational way according
to level of perceived ris k .
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The variance in processing of the CDQ items has been tested
using major fie ld of study as a dependent variable.

This study was

based on the personality differences according to a major f ie ld of
study found by Lehman (1965) and Sternberg (1955).

These studies

found that science majors have d is tin c tiv e ly d iffere n t personality
characteristics, attitudes and ways of dealing with problems when
compared with lib e ra l arts and business majors.

Sims, Harley and

Weiner (1974), using the above studies, had subjects of various
majors f i l l out a CDQ.

A ll subjects showed a sign ifican t s h ift

toward risk from individual decision to the group decision.

D if

ferences between in it ia l scores fa ile d to show significance; how
ever, in the group condition there was a sign ifican t difference be
tween lib e ra l arts majors (M=4.95) and the science majors (M=5.76;
Mann-Whitney 11=2.5, p

.0 5 ).

In other words, the science majors, as

a group, were more conservative than were the lib e ra l arts majors.
In addition to the possible subjective individual effects a l
ready presented, there is some evidence to support the perceived
locus of control as having some e ffe c t on the way in which a
situation w ill be perceived by a subject (Cohen, 1964; Feather, 1969;
Kelley, 1967; Streufert and S treu fert, 1969; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla,
Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum, 1971; and Wortman, Costanzo, and W itt,
1973).

These studies a ll discussed the a ttrib u tio n of desirable

outcomes of an event to an internal qu ality of the individuals in the
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situ atio n, whereas, negative outcomes were attributed to an ex
ternal factor.
hypothesis.

This might be seen as a variation of the Just World

The "good guys" have the internal q u a lities considered

important, thus they w ill always win.

The "bad guys" are simply

receiving th e ir ju s t reward for being bad guys.

The difference is

that the focus has switched from the situation or role to certain
internal qu alities of the individual described in the situation.
For example, in the item which deals with the e le c tric a l engineer
who has been offered a position with a new company which is less
secure and more promising than his present position, the subject
may process the information with regard to the a b ility of the engineer,
although his a b ility was not e x p lic itly stated in the item.

The

processing would work in this manner: the engineer must be par
tic u la rly competent and able as an engineer fo r him to have been
offered the position with the^new company.

I f the company succeeds,

he is in that much better a position; i f the company f a ils , he should
be able to market his s k ills and get into a position no worse
(maybe better) than the position he is presently occupying.
This internal quality facto r is of particu lar importance in
lig h t of a study by Jellison and Riskind (1971).

In that study i t

was found that the subject's perception of the central character's
a b ilit y correlated with th e ir perception of the central character's
risk taking.

The researchers suggested that the risky s h ift or

choice s h ift lite ra tu re should be reinterpreted in terms of perceived
a b ility of the central character in the item.

The above perception of a b ility factor relates to the notion
of the central character exerting control over the situation.

This

notion o f control has very l i t t l e to do with the rational perception
pf the individual's control over the situation (Strickland, Lewicki
and Katz, 1966; Langer, 1975).

This notion of control could be

manifested in any of a number of ways.

I t could be perceived as a

need for competence (White, 1959), an in s tin c t to master (Hendripk,
1943), a striving for superiority (Adler, 1930), or a striving for
personal causation (deCharms, 1968).

No matter how i t is termed

there is agreement that people are motivated to master th e ir environ
ment.

This mastering may occur in any of a number of ways by a

subject in evaluating or advising an individual in a situation.
This evaluation could involve the subjective u t i l i t y o f the
decision which is to be made.

That is the finding of two studies

(Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein, M ille r , Vinokur, Katz, and Crowley, 1971)
using the CDQ paradigm.

In fa c t, in the la tte r study (Burnstein

et a l . , 1971), i t was stated that the subjects made th e ir decision
of choice on the CDQ according to the subjective expected u t i l i t y
(SEU) of the decision.

This study further suggested that changes

in choice on the CDQ, i . e . , choice s h ift, were epiphenomenal in
that they were a direct result of changes in the SEU of the decision
fo r the subject.
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In lig h t of the subjective effects that may be introduced
into the CDQ paradigm, i t is apparent that research needs to be
done of the SEU effects on the CDQ and the interpretation of findings.
This should be done with a control fo r experimenter bias and with
regard for the reasons and processes used by the individuals in the
paradigm.

This is the direction of the present study.

In an e ffo rt to define and thus lim it the scope of the investi
gation, the present study w ill be lim ited to the specific effects
of the information processing level of an individual on a choice
selection paradigm.

Information processing (IP ) and its effects

w ill be discussed in the next section of this paper.
Information Processing
Although there are several ways information processing (IP)
has been defined and conceptualized (Schroder, Driver, and S treu fert,
1969; Harvey, 1963, 1966), this study w ill center on B ie ri's (1955,
1961) conceptualization and d efin itio n of IP or cognitive complexity/
sim plicity with reference to relevant findings from other con
ceptualizations.
There is a need a t this point to define a number of terms that
w ill be used in this section.

D ifferen tiatio n refers to the number

of elementary dimensions (stable, unique orderings of stim uli) in
dividuals use in th e ir perceptions of the world.

The uniqueness of

23
the dimension relates to the notion that the dimension must not
have a strong correlation with another dimension fo r i t to have an
e ffe c t on the individual's perception of the world.

For example,

i f two of the dimensions on the Repertory Role Test (see Appendix A)
derived the same responses, these dimensions would not be considered
unique and separate, rather they would be noted as one dimension or
as parts of a third dimension.

More s p e c ific a lly , i f a subject

rated the individual roles the same on two dimensions (outgoing-shy
and happy-sad) i t would be interpreted that these two dimensions were
re la tiv e ly the same dimension fo r that particu lar individual.

An

individual who uses several unique dimensions w ill be a more cog
n itiv e ly complex or of a higher IP level than an individual who uses
fewer unique dimensions.
A rticulation or discrimination refers to the number of gradations
used to place stimulus objects along a unique dimension.

For ex

ample, on the Repertory Test (see Appendix A), i f an individual uses
a dimension (outgoing-shy) uniquely and places the rankings of the
roles on the 3 and 8 , the individual is using a bipolar discrimination
on that dimension.
level of IP.

This bipolar discrimination would denote a low

I f the individual uses a ll ten of the intervals on a

unique dimension, the individual is using a wide variation discrim inination on that dimension.

Highly discriminated dimensions would

denote a higher level of IP.
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Integration refers to the way in which several unique dimen
sions are combined to derive the individual's perception of the
world.

I f an individual relates a ll of the dimensions in his schema

in a fixed or hierarchical pattern, the individual is of a low IP
le v e l.

This integration has only the dimensions related d ire c tly

to each other through a restricted pattern.

As the integration-level

increases more alternative ways of relatin g various dimensions to
various stimuli are possible, thus a greater complexity in the in 
dividual's perceptual evaluation scales.

A high IP individual would

use a number of intermediate combinations and fle x ib le perspectives
for organizing the several dimensions in a high IP individual.
High IP under a ll three of.the above determinations deals with
the abstractness of the organizational schema or structure of the
individual.

The higher the level of IP the more abstract the in d iv i

dual's schema fo r viewing his world and defining the elements within
that world.

In the other direction, the more concrete the individual's

scheme of his world, the lower the IP le v e l.
Bieri (1955, 1961) based his conceptualization of IP on Kelley's
theory of personality constructs (1955) which focuses on the d iffe re n 
tia tio n and discrimination used by an individual.

This theory assumes

each individual has a system of dimensions which he uses in the per
ception of his environment and that the characteristics describing
the relations among these dimensions refe r to a person's cognitive
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schema of the world, thus a dimensional perspective of the in d iv i
dual's scheme of his world.
Information processing research opens the need to investigate
how an individual makes certain choices in a given situation.

This

investigation could possibly explain why there is a difference in
response in sim ilar situations by d iffe re n t individuals even though
they have apparently been given the same information from which to
make th e ir choices or why the same individual makes a d iffe re n t
choice a fte r the passage of time.

We could take the stance of

Greaves (1971), "to be purely colloquial about i t , d iffe re n t people
actually think d iffe re n tly , which, in turn, has a specific e ffe c t on
the way they act." (p. 52)

Although this statement has in tu itiv e

v a lid ity , i t does nothing to control fo r individual variance effec ts,
or help explain how these differences a ffe c t the various paradigms
used in research, or help explain the differences in various individual
processes fo r reaching d iffe re n t decisions in the same choice
situations.
I f there are differences among individual's cognitive schema of
the world, how might these a ffe c t the individual's response to various
situations or paradigms?

S p e c ific a lly , for each of the various re

search environments used we can only hypothesize the e ffe c t of IP
level on the results achieved through a p articu lar paradigm.

These

hypotheses would need to be based on the research which shows that
d iffe re n t IP levels result in d iffe re n t outcomes on certain areas of
investigation.
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Bieri (1955) found that high IP individuals more accurately
perceived differences between themselves and others.

Low IP in 

dividuals, on the o.ther hand, more often inaccurately perceived
s im ila ritie s between themselves and others.

These differences were

interpreted by Bieri as indicating that high IP individuals are
more versatile in both the simple and complex realms of behavior.
These conclusions supported the notion that high IP individuals are
better able to accurately predict the behavior of others thus are
better able to regulate th e ir own behavior to reach desired goals.
This p re d ic ta b ility and perceived control may increase the SEU and
lessen the risk of particular decisions fo r high IP individuals.
Higher level IP individuals perceived greater potential fo r con
f l i c t in relationships (Tripodi and B ie ri, 1966).

High IP in d iv i

duals are more tolerant of change and c o n flic t in th e ir environment
“ because of th e ir v e rs a tility in the behavioral realms.

Thus, i t

could be reasonably suggested that higher level IP individuals could
more e ffe c tiv e ly deal with uncertainty in th e ir environment, such as
the uncertainty of a risky decision, than a lower level IP individual.
Lower level IP individuals are restricted in th e ir adaptive be
havior because of th e ir inaccurate perceptions of s im ila ritie s between
s e lf and other (B ie ri, 1955) and the characteristic categorical
(black-white) thinking behavior of low d iffe re n tia tin g individuals
(Schroder, Driver, and S treu fert, 1969).

This restrictio n in adaptive
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behavior hinders the lower level processor in his attempts to deal
with uncertain situations and decision resolution where the outcome
is uncertain.
One point which has been overlooked in research is the notion
that the experimenter has a certain IP system which influences his
perception of the world.

The importance of this observation is that

the experimenter's IP level affects the way in which he approaches
the experiment and the subjects, eith er of which influence the
results of the research.

Through the instruments the experimenter may

inadvertently introduce restriction s on dimensions to the paradigm
which influence the ways in which the subjects respond, i . e . , on the
CDQ, the subject may not rela te one option, by i t s e lf , as being con
sidered risky without a comparison of more than two options (status
quo vs 1 a lte rn a tiv e ).

I t could be that the experimenter's con

ception of what the paradigm and its interpretation are revealing
about human performance is unrelated to what the subjects actually
perceived as th e ir goal in the paradigm.

This could lead to a com

parison being made of perceptual "apples and oranges", so to speak.
In an attempt to test the variance between subjects' perception
and the experimenter's perception in a choice paradigm, i t would be
necessary to provide a number of options in such a way that there is
not a feature which would inherently make one option ris k ie r than any
of the other options presented.

This would allow the subects to respond
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using th e ir unique dimensional schema of the world for the sorting
of the options.

This could be compared with the experimenter's

ranking and selection of the same options.
In this study the riskiness of the options has been defined as .
the uncertainty of the outcome and the amount of control which the
individual could exercise over the outcome of the choice.

That is

not to say that these two factors are d is tin c t e n titie s which are
mutually exclusive.

I t is realized in the context of what has been

presented with regard to individual differences and the SEU concept
that perception of uncertainty and control would have areas of mutual
and undifferentiated e ffe c t.

For the purposes of this study, per

ceived uncertainty and control are combined under the dimension of
risk/caution.

I f there is perceived to be greater uncertainty and

less control, then the condition is defined as increasing the r is k i
ness of the

option.

I f there is perceived to be less uncertainty

and more control, then the condition is defined as decreasing the
riskiness of the option.
The next chapter presents the specific rationales and hypotheses
fo r researching the effects of individual information processing
levels upon the ranking and selection of various options.

CHAPTER I I I
HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE
The thesis developed to this point, is that individuals d iffe r
in th e ir perceptions of the world.

These perceptions d iffe r e n tia lly

a ffe c t behaviors exhibited by individuals.

The task of this section

is to delineate the specific hypotheses and rationale concerning the
specific effects of individual levels of information processing.
The measurement instruments used for this research were de
veloped to provide college students with a relevant instrument for
ranking and choosing items with regard to the risk/caution dimensions
of the item.

Subjects ranked nine options of equal risk/caution

q u a lity , i . e . , there is no feature of an option which makes i t in 
herently ris k ie r or more cautious than the other eight options lis te d .
The self-ranking of the options helps to control for experimenter
bias and allows for a more meaningful measure of individual per
ceptions of the risk in each item.

I t also provides a number of

options rather than the binary condition of the CDQ options (see
Methodology chapter for a further description).

:

The four groups of information processing individuals
(high, medium high, medium low and low) w ill rank
choice options sig n ific an tly d iffe re n t from each other.
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I f higher level IP persons form a more elaborate and m u lti
variate personal impression of th e ir world (N ido rff and Crockett,
1965; Rosenkrantz and Crockett, 1965), then i t is reasonable to
expect high IP individuals to rank the options in a m ultivariate
way, i . e . , there w ill be less ranking of the options through the ex
clusion or inclusion of a single common feature of the options.

For

example, i t would not be expected that higher level IP persons would
rank a ll of the options with a single feature in common in one of
the individual sorting stacks (see Methodology).

This would amount

to high IP individuals using less "leveling" behavior in evaluating
the options than lower IP persons (Lundy, 1956; Berkowitz, 1957;
B ie ri, 1955).
H2 :

Under content analysis, reasons for choices and
rankings w ill be d iffe re n t between the four levels
of information processing (high, medium high,
medium low and low).
Given that higher level IP persons w ill glean more information

from the options (Tripodi and B ie ri, 1964), i t is reasonable to
assume that the reasons high IP individuals give w ill show more ex
tension of information beyond that given in the options as listed
on the instruments.

High IP individuals would be expected to show

a greater v e rs a tility in th e ir conceptualization of the options
and th e ir reasons fo r ranking the options in the manner they did
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(Tripodi and B ie ri, 1966).

This rationale in conjunction with

the rationale fo r the f i r s t hypothesis provides the support for
this second hypothesis.
The third and fourth hypotheses consider the option choices
made by the individuals on the two instruments.

On the f i r s t in 

strument, the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS), the subjects w ill
choose the option they would prefer for taking a midterm examination
worth 50% of th e ir fin a l grade in an elective class.

On the second

instrument, the Class Registration Ranking Sheet (CRRS), the subjects
w ill choose a class format to reg ister fo r in th e ir major fie ld of
study.
H3 :

On the Midterm Options Ranking Sheet, high information
' processing individuals w ill s ig n ific a n tly more often choose
options requiring individual performance, while lower level
information processing individuals w ill choose the group
of own choosing options s ig n ific a n tly more often than
the randomly selected group or individual performance
options.

:

On the Class Registration Ranking Sheet, high information
processing individuals w ill s ig n ific a n tly more often
choose the independent study options, while the lower
information processing individuals w ill s ig n ific an tly
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more often choose the lecture class options in
the other option categories.
I f high information processing individuals are more certain
of th e ir judgments than lower level information processing in 
dividuals (Tripodi and B ie ri, 1966), i t is reasonable to suggest
that high information processing persons have a positive perception
*

of th e ir a b ilit y to make judgments and choices.

This, coupled with

the findings of Jellison and Riskind (1971) that individuals choose
alte rn a tiv e on the basis of the perceived a b ility of the central
character, would make i t reasonable to assume that higher level in 
formation processing individuals would choose individual as opposed
to group options.

Lower level information processing individuals,

on the other hand, would be expected to choose options with the most
consistency in the elements of evaluation o f th e ir performance in a
class, i . e . , the objective test has only one c r ite r ia for evaluation
(rig h t or wrong) and known professor gives experimental certainty
to the c rite ria of evaluation fo r the individual.

The group of own

choosing options and the known professor options would provide more
certainty fo r the lower information processor because of his re
s tricted adaptability to changes in the environment and relationships.
In the th ird and fourth hypotheses there is no predicted
direction fo r the choices to be made by the middle two groups
(medium high and medium low) of the information processing d is t r i
bution.

I t has not been determined at this point whether these two
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groups w ill produce a weaker e ffe c t in the predicted direction
of choices of the two end groups (high and low) of the information
processing d is trib u tio n , or i f the two middle groups (medium high
and medium low) in the information processing distrib ution w ill
produce an e ffe c t d iffe re n t from the two end groups (high and low)
in strength and direction.

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Subjects
F ifty subjects were drawn from an introductory course in
interpersonal communication at the University of Montana during
Spring quarter of 1976.

The subject population was equally

divided between males and females.

The subjects were under

graduate students between the ages of 18 and 22 years old.
Procedure
The procedure consisted of two contacts with the subjects.
The f i r s t contact was to collect information processing data on
individual subjects.

This contact was done in conjunction with

data collection by Dr. Pettersen.

The same information processing

data was used fo r this study as well as fo r Dr. Pettersen's re
search.

The second contact involved the collection of rankings and

choice selections on the two instruments (Midterm Option Ranking
Sheet, and the Class Registration Ranking Sheet) frpm the same
subjects for which information processing data had been collected.
The f i r s t contact consisted of the subjects f i l l i n g out a
modified form of the Repertory Role Test (Rep Test). Dr. Pettersen
collected this data.. The instructions fo r this stage of data
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collection are contained in Appendix E.
A fter the Rep Tests were completed and collected from the
f i r s t contact, they were given to a trained work-study student
fo r scoring and recording of information processing levels.
For the second contact, i t was decided to o ffe r the subjects
a 15 cent token redeemable at the campus student center ca fe te ria.
The reason fo r this token payment was to overcome some expressions
of resistance to cooperating in further experimentation.

This

resistance was due to the number of other experiments in which in 
dividual class members had been asked to particip ate.
The second contact took place approximately one month a fte r the
f i r s t contact.

This contact consisted of administering two in 

struments to subjects fo r th e ir ranking of the options and th e ir
choice selection.

The task consisted of having the subjects read the

options and sort them according to a set procedure as set forth in
Appendix F.
Following the second contact, the rankings and choices were re
corded and sorted on a master record with individual information
processing levels fo r la te r data analysis.

The reasons fo r the

rankings and choices were content analyzed a fte r being placed into
four (high, medium high, medium low and low) quartiles of information
processing according to the individual subject's IP score on the
Rep Test.
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Operationalizations
The rankings of the options are used to determine the ris k /
cautions of the individual's choice according to his own perceptions.
The options in the f i r s t stacking (see Appendix F) are operationally
defined as being risky options fo r that individual.

The options in

the second stacking are operationally defined as being the cautious
options fo r that individual.

The remaining options are defined

operationally as that person's neutral options.
I f an individual chooses an option from the f ir s t stacking, that
w ill be considered a risky choice.

I f the person chooses an option

from the second stacking, that w ill be considered a cautious choice.
I f the person chooses an option from the remaining stack, that w ill
be considered a neutral choice.

All of these definitions are made

regardless of the actual option involved.
A risky option is defined as one in which the subject perceives
that there is uncertainty with regard to the positive outcome of the
option and the amount of perceived control the individual could
exercise to influence the outcome.

On the f ir s t instrument, the

Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS), the certainty variables are the
type of test for a midterm examination (objective te s t, subjective
test and class presentation).

The perceived control variables on

the MORS are the way in which the test is to be taken (in d iv id u a lly ,
in a randomly selected group or a group of the subject's own
choosing) (see Fig. 1).
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Elements of Perceived Control
Randomized
Group
C rite ria
for
Evaluation
Elements
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Fig. 1.

Own
Group

Individual
Performance

Class
Presentation

Option B

Option F

Option G

Subjective
Test

Option I

Option A

Option E

Objective
Test

Option D

Option H

Option C

Matrix for Options on the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS).

On the second instrument, the Class Registration Ranking Sheet
(CRRS), the certainty variables are the amount of knowledge available
about the professor of a class (known professor, unknown professor,
and a s ta ff member).

The control variables on the CRRS are the type

of teaching method for the class (independent study, a lecturediscussion class and a lecture class) (see Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2.
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Subjective
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Option I

Option B
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Objective
Test

Option E

Option G

Option C

Matrix for Options on the Class Registration Ranking Sheet
(CRRS)

The above variables were placed on a 3 x 3 matrix.

This pro

cedure generated nine options with regard to the two situations,
i . e . , the taking of a midterm examination worth 50% of the quarter's
grade and registering fo r an elective class in the subject's major
fie ld of study.

This provided two instruments in which there were

no options which were inherently ris k ie r or more cautious than the
other eight options on the p articu lar instrument.

The instruments

and th e ir instructions contained a ll pertinent information concerning
the respective set of options which was related to a ll of the options
in the p articu lar set (see Appendices B and C).
The IP level of the individuals was determined by the subject's
score on the modified Rep Test.

The modifications concerned the

range of the scale and the positive/negative nature of the scale.
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The range was increased from six (+3) to ten (1-10).

The reason

for this change was to allow for a broader range of responses and
to allow fo r more discrimination and d iffe re n tia tio n on the in
strument.

The second modification was the placing of the scale on

the positive side o f zero.

This modification was to prevent the

inadvertent narrowing of the scale's range because an individual
refused to rate one or more of the roles on the negative end of the
scale, which would functionally reduce the range or discriminatory
use of the scales.

This res tric tio n of the instrument would in 

fluence the discrimination score on the instrument (see Appendix A).
The scoring of the modified Rep Test was done using the scoring
procedure employed by B ie ri, Atkins, Brian, Leaman, M ille r , and
Tripodi (1966).
Cognitive complexity is measured by comparing each
rating in a row with the rating d ire c tly below i t
( i . e . , for the same person) in the other rows on the
matrix. In comparing any two construct rows, a score
of one is given fo r every exact agreement of ratings
on any one person. This matching is carried out for
a ll possible comparisons, and the scores for each
comparison are added to give one total score. Since
there are 45 possible row comparisons in a 10 x 10
m atrix, the highest possible score is 450. A score
of 450 would indicate that the judge have the same
rating on a ll bipolar constructs to a ll of the role
types. This judge would be re la tiv e ly simple be
cause he is using his construct dimensions in an
identical manner to construe a ll the individuals
on the grid. On the other hand, a person with a
score as low as 100 is presumed to be re la tiv e ly
cognitively complex because he uses constructs
d iffe re n tly in discriminating among people (p. 190).
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On the modified Rep Test used in this study, i t would be
expected that the overall d istrib ution of scores would be lower than
the distribution of scores on an unmodified Rep Test.

The reason

fo r this is simply that the scale has been moved downward to have
the scale begin at zero rather than 45.

A score of 450 would s t i l l

be considered as the score of a re la tiv e ly low information processing
person.

A score of 65 would be considered that of a re la tiv e ly high

information processing person.

Since to this author's knowledge there

has been no standardized range of scores or division of scores into
levels, i t is d if f ic u lt to make an accurate comparison of ranges be
tween the modified and unmodified Rep Test.
Subjects were placed into IP levels by dividing the total IP
d istrib ution into qu artiles.
high IP group.
IP group.

The f i r s t q u artile was considered the

The second q u artile was considered the medium high

The third q u artile was considered the medium low IP group.

The fourth q u artile was considered the low IP group.
Data Analysis
There were three analyses for the data which were collected in
the study.

The same analysis w ill be used on responses made on the

Midterm Option Ranking Sheet and the Class Registration Ranking Sheet
unless otherwise indicated.
The f i r s t hypothesis was analyzed by determining the correlation
between the rankings and the IP level of the subjects making the
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response.

A Kendall co effic ie n t of concordance: W was used fo r this

analysis.

A W = 0 was expected on the rankings of each instrument.

A W equal to 0 would show that the individuals with d iffe re n t IP
levels were using s ig n ific a n tly d iffe re n t perceptions and c rite ria
sets to rank the options.
The analysis of the second hypothesis involved a content analysis
of the reasons given fo r the rankings and the choice selections with
regard to the IP level of the individuals making the responses.
Difference in the reasons were expected in lin e with the rationale
fo r this hypothesis.
The analysis of the choices made on each of the instruments by
the various levels of IP employed an Extension of the Median Test.
A high correlation was expected between IP level and the choices
made as stated in the third and fourth hypotheses fo r two instruments,
the MORS and the CRRS, respectively.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
The present chapter w ill report the results of the completed
analyses.

Results are reported for each hypothesis in succession.

The range of the information processing distribution was
55-187 with a mean equal to 103.28 for the subjects responding to
the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS) (N=50).

The IP d is trib u 

tion for the subjects responding to the Class Registration Ranking
Sheet (MORS) had a range of 55-187 with a mean equal to 102.80
(N=49).

The same group of subjects responded to both instruments,

but one of the subject's responses on the CRRS had to be eliminated
because i t was incomplete.
Information Processing levels were divided into four quadrants
and designated: high IP; medium high IP; medium low IP; and low IP.
Scores obtained from the Rep Test yielded ranges for the four levels
as follows:

55-83, 85-95, 100-117 and 118-187 for high, medium

high, medium low and low groups, respectively.
were 70.31, 89.5, 108.5, and 139.92.

The respective means

I t should be noted a t this

point that there appears to be a wide disparity in the ranges of
the four IP groupings.

This phenomena w ill be discussed la te r in

the Discussion Chapter.
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Hypothesis one states that the four groups of IP individuals
w ill rank order the options on the instruments signficantly
d iffe re n t from each other.

The hypothesis was s ta tis tic a lly analyzed

by the Kendall c o efficien t of concordance:

with an expected

W = 0, or no s ta tis tic a lly sign ifican t correlation.

A significant

correlation between the groups' rankings would indicate that the
groups were using the same c rite ria in th e ir ranking of the options.
2
On the MORS, W = .83 (X = 26.56, df=8, p < .0 0 1 ) suggesting a
sign ifican t correlation between the groups' rankings.
/ 2

W = .83 (X

On the CRRS,

» 26.7, df=8, p < .0 0 1 ) again yielding a sign ifican t

correlation between the four groups' rankings.

These results did not

support the f i r s t hypothesis because they showed a sign ifican t
correlation between the rankings of the various IP groups.

The

sign ifican t correlation indicated that the various groups used
basically the same c r ite r ia to rank the options on the two instruments.
The second hypothesis states that the reasons given fo r the
rankings and choices w ill be s ig n ific a n tly d iffe re n t from each of
the four IP groups.

This analysis consisted of a content analysis of

the reasons given by the subject on the record sheets for each of the
instruments.

^S tatistical analyses are taken from Nonparametric S ta tis tics
fo r the Behavioral Sciences by Sidney Siegel (1956).
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On the MORS, the reasons fo r the various rankings did not
vary greatly between the four levels of IP.

The rankings were

generally determined by the perceived effects of doing the work in
a group of own choosing or in d iv id u a lly .

The reason centered

around the perceived control which could be exerted in a group of
own choosing and individual reward (grade) fo r individual e ffo rt
(see Appendix G).
The reasons for the rankings on the CRRS generally dealt with
the p re d ic ta b ility of the professor and what could be expected in
the p a rtic u la r class (see Appendix H).
The reasons for the choices on the MORS did show some trends
between the four groups.

The high IP persons gave more reasons

which dealt with the individual control that could be exercised.
Low IP persons dealt more with the security or pooling of knowledge
fo r a better grade.

The medium low persons dealt more with th e ir

perceived control in an option, while medium high IP individuals
scattered th e ir reasons equally over knowing the persons involved
in the option, the amount of perceived control that they could
exercise in the option and the p a rtic u la r type of te st that would
be involved (see Appendix I ) .
On the CRRS, the reasons fo r the choices were mainly influenced
by what could be expected in the class.

High IP persons referred

to knowing the p articu lar mode of the class or how the class would
be taught as being th e ir main factor fo r p re d ic ta b ility .

Medium

high persons stated the reasons fo r th e ir option choices had to do
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with knowing the professor in rela tio n to the p artic u lar way in
which the class would be conducted.

The medium low individuals

gave reason for th e ir choices which related to knowing the professor
in the option regardless o f the way in which the class was to be
conducted, and the amount of perceived control which could be ex
ercised.

Low IP individuals referred to th e ir "feeling less

uncertain" in th e ir choices than in the remaining options.

In

spite of the apparent variance in the reasons given for the choices,
the vast majority of the option choices were in the Known Professor
category of the options (see Appendix J).
Hypothesis three states

that high IP individuals w ill more

often choose the individual performance options on the MORS, while
low IP individuals w ill more'often choose the group of own choosing
options (see Table 3 ).

Seven of the thirteen high IP individuals

chose the individual performance options,
divuduals chose the group of

while fiv e high IP in-

own choosing options and one chose the

randomly selected group options.

Seven of the low IP persons chose

the group of own choosing options, while four selected the individual
performance options and one selected the randomly selected group
options.
High IP individuals favored the class presentation options in
th e ir choices.

Medium high IP individuals were the only other group

which indicated a clear preference for a type of midterm te s t,
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Table 1.

The D is trib u tio n o f Choices o f the MORS Disregarding
The Type o f Test to be Given

IP Group
Individual
Performance

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

Own
Group

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

Randomi zed
Group

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

the subjective te s t.

Objective
Test

Subjective
Test

Class
Presentation

Total

2
2
3
2

1
4
3
1

4
1
1
3

7
7
7
6

2
3

1
3
1
2

4
2
3
2

5
5
6
7

1

1

1

1

The medium low and low IP groups scattered th e ir

choices over the three types of midterm testing procedures (see table 4).
The fourth hypothesis states that thigh IP individuals w ill more
often choose the independent study options on the CRRS, while low
IP individuals w ill more often choose the lecture class options.
This was not found in the data.

Only four of the high IP individuals

chose the independent study options, while six chose the lecturediscussion options and two chose the lecture class options.

None of

the low IP individuals chose the lecture class options, while nine
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Table 2.

The D is trib u tio n o f Choices on the MORS Disregarding
the Way in Which the Test is to be Taken
IP
Group

Individual
Performance

Own
Group

Randomized
Group

Total

Objective
Test

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

2
2
3
2

2
3

2
2
5
5

Subjective
Test

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

1
4
3
1

1
3
1
2

2
7
4
3

Class
Presentation

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

4
1
1
3

4
2
3
2

1

9
3
4
6

1

chose the independent study options and three chose the lecturediscussion class options (see Table 3 ).
The choices on the CRRS were lim ited mostly to the Known
Professor options.

Only two individuals (one high IP and onw low

IP) in the total distribution chose the Unknown Professor options.
No individuals chose any of the S ta ff Member options.

This extremely

uneven d istrib ution reduced the elements influencing the subjects'
decisions from the nine on the 3 x 3 matrix used to generate the
options to three elements, i . e . , independent study, lectu re-discussion class and lecture class (see Table 4).
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Table 3.

The D is trib u tio n o f Choices on the CRRS Disregarding
Knowledge o f the Professor
Known
Professor

Independent
Study

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

4
4
3
9

LectureDiscussion

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

6
6
7
2

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

2
2
2

Lecture
Class

Unknown
Professor

S taff
Member

Total
4
4
4
9

1

6
6
7
3

1

2
2
2

An extension of the median test was used to test i f there were
any differences in the amount of riskiness, according to the
subjects' own risk/caution scales, between the four IP groups.

On

the MORS this test showed no s ig n ifican t difference in the riskiness
2
of the choices made by the four IP groups (X = 2.09, df=3, p < .5 0 ).
There was a trend indicated in the data.

This trend showed the two

middle groups, medium high IP and medium low IP, made more choices
below the median than the two end groups, high IP and low IP (see
table 5).

Choices below the median are ris k ie r than those choices

above the median.
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Table 4.

The D is trib u tio n o f Choices on the CRRS Disregarding
the Type o f Class to be Taken
IP
Group

Known
Professor

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

Unknown
Professor

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

S ta ff
Member

Table 5.

Independent
Study

LectureDiscussion

Lecture
Class

4
4
3
9

6
6
7
2

2
2
2

Total
12
12
12
11

1

1
1

1

High
Medium High
Medium Low
Low

The Extension of the Median Test Data for the MORS

High IP

Medium
High IP

Medium
Low IP

Low IP

Total

Above the
Median

6

4

4

7

21

Below the
Median

6

8

9

6

29

12

13

13

50

Total

12
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The extension o f the median te s t showed a s ig n ific a n t d i f 
ference (X^ = 10.63, df=3,

p ^ .0 2 ) between the fo u r IP groups w ith

regard to the riskiness of th e ir choices on the CRRS.

Analysis

showed there was a nonsignificant difference in the riskiness of
the choices made by the high IP groups and the low IP group, also
there was a nonsignificant difference between the riskiness of the
choices made by the high IP group and the low IP group, also there
was a nonsignificant difference between the riskiness of the choices
made by the medium high IP group and the medium low IP group.

A

s ig n ifican t difference was found between the high IP group and the
medium high IP group (X

2

= 6.18, d f= l, p^..02) and the high IP
2
group and the medium low IP group (X = 3.71 , d f= l, p < .1 0 ). A

s ig n ifican t difference was found between the Tow IP group and the
2
medium low IP group (X = 3.71, d f= l, p ^ .1 0 ) and between the low
2
IP group and the medium high IP group (X - 6.18, d f= l, p < .0 2 ).
The difference between the two high IP groups, medium high IP and high
IP, and the two low groups, medium low and low, was nonsignificant
(see table 6 ).
An extension of the median test showed a sig n ifican t d if ference (X

2

= 9.00, d f= l, p< .0 1 ) between the riskiness of the

choices of the two end, high and low, IP groups and the riskiness of
the choices of the two middle, medium high and medium low, IP groups.
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Table 6.

The Extension of the Median Test Data fo r the CRRS

High IP

Medium
High IP

Medium
Low IP

Low IP

Total

Above the
Median

8

2

4

8

22

Below the
Median

4

10

9

4

27

12

12

13

12

49

Total

In other words, the two middle IP groups made ris k ie r choices,
according to th e ir own scale, than did the two end groups.

The

choices of the two end groups were more cautious than the choices
made by the two middle groups (see Table 7 ).

Table 7.

The Extension of the Median Test Data for the Combined
Groups on the CRRS
HighLow

Medium HighMedium Low

Total

Above the
Median

16

6

22

Below the
Median

8

19

27

24

25

49

Total

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this chapter is to f i r s t discuss the results
with regard to the te s t of the'hypotheses.

The second goal w ill

be to draw conclusions from the findings of the research.

The

chapter w ill conclude with a section on the implications of the
present research and some possible direction for future research.
Test of Hypotheses
The f i r s t hypothesis states:
The four groups of IP individuals (high,
medium high, medium low and low) w ill
rank the options of the instruments sig
n ific a n tly d iffe re n t from each other.
The Kendall c o efficien t of concordance:

W was too large with

a probability level which would not allow the null hypothesis to be
rejected.

The analysis fo r this hypothesis showed that a ll four of

the IP groups were using essentially the same c r ite r ia to rank the
options on the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet and the Class Regis
tra tio n Ranking Sheet, thus the null hypothesis was not rejected.
The second hypothesis states:
Under content analysis, reasons fo r the
choices and rankings w ill be s ig n ific a n tly
d iffe re n t between the four levels of IP
(high, medium high, medium low and low).
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The reasons given fo r the rankings broke into three basic
categories.

The three categories were (T) the other persons in 

volved in the options, (2) the mode o f the class or te s t, and
(3) the amount of perceived individual control which could be
exercised over the outcome of the p articu lar options.

The pre

dicted rejection of groups of options by low IP individuals was
observed, but this means of ranking the options was used by a ll of
the levels of IP with equal frequency.

I t was also expected that

high IP individuals would show more extension of reasons beyond
the information in the options, i . e . , include other related in fo r
mation or information other than that e x p lic it in the options in
th e ir reasons fo r the rankings.

This addition of information was

not observed in the reasons given by any of the four IP groups.
The reasons given fo r the choices did show some interesting
trends.

On the MORS, high IP individuals gave more reasons which

related to the amount of personal control and individual reward for
individual e ffo rt than to the other persons involved in the options
or the p artic u la r way of taking the midterm examination.

Low TP

individuals gave more reasons which related to the effects of a
number of people pooling th e ir information and knowledge of a test
with many reasons including the aspect of the amount of control that
could be exercised in a group of th e ir own choosing.

These reasons

were consistent with the trends indicated in the choices that were
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made by these two groups.

The reasons given by the medium high

and medium Tow IP groups were scattered over the three categories.
There was no consensus in the reasons given fo r th e ir choices*
The trends in the reasons fo r the choices were consistent with the
trends in the choices made by each group.
The reasons for choices made on the CRRS indicated that high
IP individuals were more concerned in th e ir decisions with the
particu lar mode of the class, while the low IP persons responded
that they f e l t less certain in th e ir choices.

Medium high in d iv i

duals gave reasons fo r th e ir choices which related more often to the
p articu lar professor.

Medium Tow IP persons produced a scattered

set of reasons over the three categories.
Hypothesis two was not supported, although there were some
general trends in the reasons given fo r the various choices.

There

was no s ta tis tic a l test fo r the minor differences that were observed
because of the small number of subjects which were involved in the
majors reasons.
The th ird hypothesis states:
High IP individuals w ill s ig n ific a n tly more
often choose options requiring individual
performance, while low IP individuals w ill
choose the group of own choosing options
s ig n ific a n tly more often than the randomly
selected group or individual performance options.
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Although there was a trend of choices in the direction of
the hypothesis, the null hypothesis fo r the MORS could not be
rejected.

As can be seen on Table 1, the options of individual

performance and group of own choosing were overwhelmingly the choice
of individuals in a ll four IP
provide

groups.

This

phenomenondidnot

the predicted results according to the th ird hypothesis.

The third hypothesis was not supported by the results.
The fourth hypothesis states:
High IP individual w ill s ig n ific a n tly more
often choose the. independent study options,
while low IP individuals w ill s ig n ific a n tly
more often choose the lecture class
options
than the other option categories.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected fo r the fourth
hypothesis.

The results showed that low IP persons more often

chose the independent study options than did the high IP persons.
The high IP individuals chose the lecture-discussion options more
often than e ith e r of the other options.

The low IP individuals

chose the independent study option over the lecture-discussion option
by 9 to 2 with the other three IP groups choosing the lectureduscussion option over the independent study option (high IP group,
6-4;

medium high IP group, 6-4; mediumlow IP group, 7-3, respec

tiv e ly ) .
Conclusions
This section w ill take the findings o f the present research and
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apply them to the choice s h ift phenomenon and the proposed
explanations fo r that phenomenon.
The f i r s t explanation of the choice s h ift phenomenon was the
diffusion of responsibility (Kogan and Wallach, 1964).

This ex

planation states that individuals in a group w ill make a ris k ie r
choice as a function of the decrease in the fear of individual
fa ilu re .

The more people who share in the risky decision or the

course the more diffuse w ill be the blame for fa ilu re .

As applied

to this study, i t should have been seen that a ll of the individuals
in th e ir choices would have chosen group options as the cautious
option, even over individual performance on the MORS and the in 
dependent study options on the CRRS.

This did not prove to be true.

In fact the low IP group which should have been more oriented toward
fa m ilia r group situations chose independent study options on the
CRRS fa r more often than did any of the other IP groups.

This would

lead one to theorize that maybe the fa m ilia rity of the situation is
more important in the group decision action than the real or imagined
sharing of the responsibility fo r the decision.
This idea of the importance of the situation gains more credence
in lig h t of the fa ct that the CRRS was reduced from nine options to
three by a ll of the subjects, less two, choosing options which dealt
with the known professor or the professor with whom they were
fa m ilia r (see Table 3).

The importance of the fa m ilia rity of the

situation can also be seen in the responses to the MORS (see Table 1)
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where a ll of the responses, less two, were in the individual
performance options or the group of own choosing.

On both in 

struments where there was uncertainty of the other individuals who
would be involved in the option (the randomized group options) or
who would be evaluating the subject's performance (s ta ff member and
unknown professor options), there were only two responses on each
instrument.

All of these findings indicate that the riskiness in a

group decision making situation may be due, not to the diffusion of
responsibility fo r the decision, rather, to the individuals being
more fa m ilia r, thus, more at ease, than in the individual situation.
The fact that there are, in essence, fa m ilia r people to interact
with and receive feedback from, the individual may feel more adept
at dealing with the situation or the choices being made.

I t must

be understood that this is not saying that there is a diffusion of
resp on sibility, i t is that the individual has another person with
which to in te ra c t, someone else to be used fo r whatever purposes,
be i t to blame, get feedback from, hurl obscure comments at or
defend, to name only arfew of the purposes.

The basic notion here

is that the interaction it s e lf assists in the choice s h ift behavior.
The direction of the s h ift would be dependent on a variety of aspects
which should be investigated through further research using in d iv i
dual perceptions of the phenomenological aspects of the situation.
With the theoretical basis laid in the above paragraphs, the
other two explanations of choice s h ift come into play.

The relevant
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information or arguments comes from the interaction which takes
place and a ll of the subtle verbal and nonverbal cues which in 
fluence a ll oral communications.

The cultural values explanation

has as its cornerstone the exchange of information which influences
the saliency of certain shared pieces of cognitive, affective and
moral factors.

All of this involves the interaction of participants

with a common purpose.

Although the goals within the attainment of

that purpose may be varied, the interaction is a prime factor.
For the relevant information explanation of choice s h ift to
hold there would have been a need for a difference in the reasons
given for the various choices, p a rtic u la rly with high IP individuals
showing more extension of information in th e ir reasons.

Since high

IP individuals glean more information from a situation (Tripodi and
B ie ri, 1964), i t is reasonable to expect that i f more information
alone produced risky choices, then high IP individuals should have
given more reasons which provided added information into the situ a
tions on the instruments.

Since the high IP individuals added no

information in th e ir reasons for th e ir choices than did the other
three IP groups, i t can be assumed that the addition of information
would not have played a more important role than would the actual
interaction necessary to gain that additional information.
In lig h t of the afore stated results with regard to the reasons
given for the choices and the apparent importance of the fa m ilia rity
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of the situation to the subject when making a risky decision, I
believe there is need and inten tative support for a fourth ex
planation of the choice s h ift phenomenon.

The fourth explanation

would state that because the individual has someone to interact
with in the p artic u la r situation which decreases the un fam iliarity
of the situation.

This could explain shifts in e ith e r the risky or

cautious directions and be parsimonious With previous research re
sults in the area of choice s h ift.

A risky s h ift could be explained

by saying that the situation was fa m ilia r to the individual because
there was and would be a fa m ilia r interactant in the situation.

A

cautious s h ift could be explained eith er as the res u lt of group co
hesion or other c u ltu ra lly determined values or role images.
The major contribution o f this study to the choice s h ift re
search deals with the e ffe c t of relevancy of the hypothetical
situations used in the choice s h ift research.

In lig h t of the

findings in this research, one of the major points of critic is m of
the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (Belovicz and Finch, 1971; Blascovich,
Beach and Ginsburg, 1973; and Mackenzie, 1971) must be reconsidered.
That critic is m has to do with the hypothetical nature of the items
on the CDQ.

The critic is m states that because the items are hy

pothetical, the subjects are not reacting to them in a ty p ic a lly
normal way, i . e . , the subjects w ill be more risky than normal.

This

criticism makes the basic assumption that individuals tend toward
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cautiousness in th e ir decision making.

In this study there was a

relevancy scale on which the subjects indicated how relevant they
f e l t the options were, in particu lar i f they thought they would
encounter the options during th e ir college career.

An extension of

the median test on the relevancy scales on both the CRRS and the
MORS indicated that the groups which made the ris k ie r decisions
(medium high IP and medium low IP groups) on both of the instruments
also rated the options as being more relevant, although significance
was only seen on the MORS (see Tables 8 and 9 ).

On the relevancy
2
scale on the MORS, the difference was nonsignificant (X = 4.99,

df=3, p ^ .2 0 ).

The difference between the two middle groups (middle

high and medium low) and the two end groups (high and low) indicated
a sig n ifican t difference (X

Table 8.

2

= 4.16, d f-1 , p < .0 2 ) (see Table 8 ).

The Extension of the Median Test Data fo r the Relevancy
Scale on the MORS

High

Medium
Medium
High_________ Low_________ Low_____ Total

Above the
Medi an

8

4

3

6

21

Below the
Median

4

8

9

6

27

12

12

12

Total

12

48
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On the CRRS, the same trend in the difference between the
ends of the distrib u tio n and the middle groups was found, although
i t was not sig n ific a n t.
nonsignificant (X

The overall difference on the CRRS was

= 1.25, df=3, p < .8 0 ).

When the relevancy scores

fo r the high and low IP groups were combined and contrasted to the
combined relevancy scores of the medium high and medium low IP groups
the difference came closer to an acceptable level of significance
(X2 = 1.05, d f= l, p < .50) (see Table 9).

Table 9.

The Extension of the Median Test Data for the Relevancy
Scale on the CRRS

High

Medium
High

Above the
Median

5

3

3

4

15

Below the
Median

7

9

10

8

34

12

12

13

12

49

Total

Medium
Low

Low

Total

When the above relevancy data is coupled with the findings on
the riskiness data (see Tables 5 and 6 ), i t becomes apparent that
those groups which saw the items to be more relevant also made
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ris k ie r decisons.

This is to ta lly contrary to the previously

mentioned critic is m of hypothetical items.

The hypothetical nature

of the items on the CRRS and the MORS is quite easy to see in lig h t
of the class schedules of the university.

Midterm examinations had

been held three weeks or more before the MORS was administered to
the subjects, thus there would be no expectation that the subjects
would think that i t was a "real" situation in preparation fo r up
coming examinations.

The scheduling fo r classes had been completed

fo r the regular school year and only the few going to summer school
would be concerned in the near future with registering fo r classes,
as on the CRRS.

These events in the university's schedule are

supplemented by the fa c t that the subjects were never told that the
instruments' results would be used fo r any purpose other than the
stated purpose of data collection fo r a thesis.
The f i r s t conclusion of this study is that there is a trend in
the responses as a function of information processing, but the d if 
ference in riskiness of choices and relevancy is between the ends of
the IP distrib u tio n and the middle of the IP distrib u tio n .

These

differences are a function of information processing as measured by
the Repertory Role Test.
The second conclusion is that there needs to be a rethinking
of the effects of relevancy on decision making.

I f increasing the

relevancy promotes ris k ie r behavior, as in this study, the measure
ment of relevancy needs to be reconsidered.

This study provided
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some unexpected results with regard to the effects of relevancy
on a sorting paradigm.
There are two possible factors that influenced the curvilinear
results that were produced on the option choices.

The f i r s t is the

fact that the procedure forced the subjects to d iffe re n tia te the
options more than they may have under normal conditions.

The sub

jects were asked to rank a ll of the options regardless of how per
tin ent the options were to the actual selection of an option.

Under

normal conditions, the subjects may have excluded groups o f options
and ranked only the remaining options which they f e lt were pertinent
in th e ir perception of the situ atio n.

Or they may have made an

"impulsive" selection without any type of ranking procedure.
The second factor was the fact that the IP instrument used may
not have measured the fu ll range of IP.

There is a c riticism of the

Rep Test (Schroder, Driver and S treu fert, 1969) that i t does not
measure the fu ll range of IP levels.

I f the range of the Rep Test

is from 0 to 450, what are the consequences with regard to the present
study since the IP distribution of subjects was in the lower th ird of
the total possible IP range?

Would this placement and d istrib ution

account for the curvilinear relationship that was found in the data?
There is the p o ssib ility that the IP distribution in this study was
too narrow to fu lly measure the differences which influence choice
decisions.

There is also the p o s s ib ility in sorting procedures, as
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used in this research, the subjects used d iffe re n tia tio n , discrimina
tion and integration, not ju s t the d iffe re n tia tio n feature IP.

In

this case another IP'measure which combines measures of d iffe re n 
tia tio n , discrimination and integration on separate scales may provide
more crucial data to the furthering of IP research and conceptualizing.
There are four possible explanations of why the curvilinear re
sults were obtained in this study.

The f ir s t explanation has to do

with the narrow and shrewd range- of the IP scores of the subjects
used.

The second explanation deals with the fact that the Rep Test

measures only the d iffe re n tia tio n of the individual, when there may
have been more involved in certain segments or throughout the sorting
and decision making process.

The third explanation deals with the

methodological considerations of measuring IP with a paper and pencil
test and observing other behavior in the experimental paradigm.

The

fin a l explanation introduces the effects of environmental complexity
and its influence on the behavior observed in the experimental paradigm.
The third and fin a l conclusion from the present study's results is
the need in future research in the area o f information processing to
report the responses of the total range of the IP d istrib u tio n .

At

this point in the IP lite ra tu re the vast majority of the studies using
the Rep Test report only the difference in responses between the lower
h alf of the IP d istrib ution and the upper h alf of the IP distrib u tio n .
The present study found no difference between the upper and lower halves
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o f the IP d is tr ib u tio n , y e t d iffe re n c e was found between the q u a rtile
responses w ith regard to ris k in e s s and relevancy.
Imp!ications
There are several questions which need to be investigated before
IP as determined on the Repertory Role Test, or other IP instruments,
can be considered a viable means of controlling or accounting for
variance in the results from experiment to experiment.

The f ir s t

question would deal with the distrib ution of the IP scale.

What would

be considered a "normal" distrib ution for research purposes?

What

would be the effects in various paradigms of a d istrib ution which is
unbalanced in a particu lar direction?
The next question deals with the norms for the various levels of
IP and where are the d is tin c tiv e levels of IP located in the various
distrib ution s.

What is a tru ly high

(above a normal score) IP score

or a tru ly low (below a normal score) IP score?

How many points need

to separate the levels of IP before the levels become unique? How
many unique levels of IP are there on a p articu lar instrument?

Is i t

possible that there are more than four unique levels of IP in a d is
tribution?

I f so, what are the effects of each of these levels in

various behavioral situations?
There is also a methodological question which needs to be researched.
What are the effects on the v a lid ity and r e lia b ilit y of the IP instru
ments when the experimental behavior
mining behavior?

is not the same as the IP deter

For example, i f the IP levels is determined on a paper
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and pencil test and the behavior in the research paradigm in verbal
behavior, i . e . , the number of verbal responses in a group discussion,
is i t conceptually reasonable or valid to say the measured level of
IP influenced the behavior in the paradigm significantly?

There may

be a need for another means of measuring IP other than the presently
used paper and pencil IP instruments.

CHAPTER V II
SUMMARY
In investigating human responses to certain events, the sub
je c tiv e nature of the individual's behavior has become more and more
apparent.

This is p a rtic u la rly true when one is investigating

phenomenological features and factors, i . e . , decision making in
p articu lar environments.
With the above notion in mind, the present study investigated
risky choices made by subjects.

The unique feature of this in v e s ti

gation was that of having the subjects rank two sets of nine options
according to riskiness.

The riskiness of the subject's choice decision

was then determined by the subject's own individual scale of the per
ceived riskiness of the choice.

This procedure allowed for a more

accurate and meaningful measurement of the risk/caution nature of the
choice according, to the particu lar subject.
The results indicated several interesting ideas, although none of
the four null hypotheses were rejected.

The f i r s t sign ifican t result

was the fact that the rankings of the options by the four Information
Processing (IP ) groups showed no sig n ific an t difference.

In other words,

the subjects did not vary in the choices because of a difference in
the way that the options were ranked.

The choice decision was re la 

tiv e ly unaffected by the way in which the options were ranked.
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fhe second idea which gained support was that d iffe re n t
individuals can make d iffe re n t choices or participate in d iffe re n t
behavior for essentially the same reasons.

In the present in ve sti

gation, no difference was found in the reasons for the particu lar
choice decisions.
The s ta tis tic a l analysis of the riskiness of the choices made and
the relevancy of the options on the two instruments did indicate
variance as a function of IP but not in the hypothesized directions.
I t was hypothesized that there would be a sig n ifica n t difference in
the riskiness of the choices made by the high and low IP individuals
with a lin ear relationship moving from the high IP individuals being
ris k ie s t to the low IP individuals being most cautious.

The results

showed that the two end groups (high IP and low IP) were more cautious
in th e ir choices than the two middle groups (medium high IP and medium
low IP ).

I t was also found that the two middle groups (medium high

IP and medium low IP) saw the options as being more relevant with
regard to what could be expected in typical college situ atio n.

Thus

the difference that was found showed that the high IP and low IP groups
were more cautious in th e ir decisions and they saw the options as being
less relevant to th e ir situ atio n.

The medium high and medium low IP

groups made ris k ie r choices on options which they saw as being more
relevant to th e ir situation.
The results provided three conclusions with regard to information
processing as measured by the Rep Test, the effects of relevancy in a
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situation and the direction for future research.

The f ir s t

conclusion was that there are differences in human responses as a
function o f IP , but the differences occurred in a cu rvilin ear fashion
with the high IP and low IP groups being more cautious and con
sidering the options less relevant than did the medium high IP and
medium low IP groups.
The second conclusion dealt with the need for a rethinking of the
effects of relevancy on decision making.

Theoretically, those subjects

who saw the options of being more relevant (medium high and medium low
IP groups) should have made more cautious decisions.

The subjects

who saw the options as being less relevant (high and low IP groups)
should have made ris k ie r choices.

The results did not show th is .

In

fa c t, the results showed the reverse of the theoretical effects of
relevancy.
The th ird conclusion presented the need for future research in the
area of information processing to report the effects of IP over more
than the differences between high and low IP groups.

There was no d i f 

ference found between the high 50 percent and low 50 percent of the
IP d is trib u tio n in this study.
This paper closed with several research questions fo r future in 
vestigation.

These questions centered on the need for norms for the

IP instruments before they can be used to e ffe c tiv e ly control for
variation from one experimental group to another, and the effects of
the vaious levels of IP in various paradigms.

The second center for

70
future research questions was the methodological considerations of
testing for IP through one behavior and having the behavior in the
experimental paradigm be d iffe re n t.

In p a rtic u la r, what are the

effects of measuring IP on a pencil and paper te st and observing
another behavior in the paradigm, i . e . , a paper and pencil test with
verbal a c tiv ity being observed in the paradigm.
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REMEMBER ::;PLEASE FILL-IN ALL THE
SQUARES WITH- A.'NUMBER FROM THE
SCALES BELOW.. THANK YOUL-

«°
10
Outging
Honest
Strong
Irresponsible
Interested in others —

Slelf-Interested

Happy
Independent
Sensitive

I

Dependent
Insensitive

Interesting'

Boring

Complex:-

Simple

S
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Instructions for Role Evaluation
The following evaluation exercise asks on to evaluate individuals
who play fa m ilia r roles.

Behind each role (in the space provided)

place the in it ia ls of a person you know who f it s the described role.
Write the in it ia ls of a d iffe re n t person for each ro le.

On another side of the 10 x 10 matrix on the next page is a l i s t of
ten scales.

Each scale consists of a pair of adjectives with

opposite meanings.

You are asked to place one of the ten numbers

which best describes the person in that role on the scale.
For example:
10
Good

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1
Bad

10 would be super good; 9 would be quite good; 8 would be good;
7 would be somewhat good; 6 would be not good; 5 would be not bad;
4 would be somewhat bad; 3 would be bad; 2 would be quite bad; and
1 would be super bad.

Rate a ll of the individuals presented on one scale before rating the
roles on the next scale.

All of the roles should be rated on the

outgoing/shy scale before any are rated on the honest/dishonest scale.
Please place a rating in each square of the matrix.
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Any questions?

I f not, please place your name on the next page

where indicated and begin f il l i n g out the matrix.
your cooperation.

Thank you for

APPENDIX B

MIDTERM OPTION RANKING SHEET
AND INSTRUCTIONS
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Midterm Option Ranking Sheet
Option A - For. the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups
of 3-4 members of your own choosing to work through a
subjective test as a group. The grade earned by the
group w ill be the grade for the individuals.
Option B - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups
of 3-4 members by random selection to give a class
presentation. The grade earned by the group w ill be
the grade for the individuals.
Option C - For the midterm, each individual w ill take an objective
test.
Option D - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups
of 3-4 members by random selection to work through an
objective te s t. The grade earned by the group w ill be
the grade fo r the individuals.
Option E - For the midterm, each individual w ill take a subjective
test.
Option F - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups
of 3-4 members of your own choosing to give a class
presentation. The grade earned by the group w ill be
the grade for the individuals.
Option G - For the midterm, each individual w ill make a class
presentation.
Option H - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups
of 3-4 members of your own choosing to work through an
objective te s t. The grade earned by the group w ill be
the grade for the individual.
Option I - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups
of 3-4 members by random selection to work through a
subjective te s t. The grade earned by the group w ill be
the grade for the individuals.
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Midterm Option Ranking Sheet Instructions
In addition to the information contained in the options, you
are to consider the options as i f they were options for taking a
midterm in a class in your major fie ld of study.
be worth 50% of your fin a l grade

The midterm is to

in the class.

The options a ll have a maximum time lim it of one class period
(50 minutes).

The tests w ill a ll be closed book with notes being

allowed for the class presentations.

All of the tests and presen

tations w ill be scored or graded by the instructor who is teaching the
course.

This instructor w ill also w rite the tests.

Make sure you have read a ll
they require.

of the options and understand what

You w ill be asked to rank order the options by how

certain you feel that you would do well i f you were to take the
suggested midterm using one of the options you have in the envelope.
Listen to the directions and i f you have a question or something is
unclear, ask the researcher.
Don't be concerned with ranking these options in a p a rtic u la rly
rig h t or correct order.

There is no rig h t or correct order.

only interested in how you perceive the options.
the record sheet out completely.

I am

Be sure to f i l l

APPENDIX C
CLASS REGISTRATION RANKING SHEET
AND INSTRUCTIONS
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Class Registration Options
Option A - You may register for a class which is prim arily lecture
being taught by a s ta ff member.
Option B - You may reg ister fo r a class which is prim arily lecturediscussion being taught by a professor who is unknown
to you.
Option C - You may register fo r a class which is prim arily in 
dependent study being taught by a professor who is
known to you.
Option D - You may register for a class which is prim arily lectiirediscussion being taught by a s ta ff member.
Option E - You may register fo r a class which is prim arily lecture
being taught by a professor who is known to you.
Option F - You may register for a class which is prim arily
independent study being taught by a professor who is
unknown to you.
Option G - You may reg ister fo r a class which is prim arily lecturediscussion being taught by a professor who is known to
you.
Option H - You may register fo r a class which is prim arily
independent study being taught by a s ta ff member.
Option I - You may register fo r a class which is prim arily lecture
being taught by a professor who is unknown to you.
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Class Registration Ranking Sheet Instructions
In addition to the information contained on the options you
are to consider the options as i f you are trying to decide on a class
fo r which you are registering.
major fie ld of study.

The classes are elective in your

All of the classes lis te d in the quarter

b u lle tin would be of value to you.

You notice that for some of the

classes you know the professor teaching the class, fo r other classes
you don't know the professor and s t i l l others are lis te d as being
taught by " s ta ff" .

You do know that a ll of the professors in the

department have been on campus for at least two years.

You also

notice that some of the classes are lis te d as independent study courses,
some are lis te d as lecture courses and others are lis te d as lecturediscussion courses.
You must decide which classes would be most uncertain for you in
terms of how well you would do.
and understand what they require.

Be sure to read a ll of the options
Listen to the directions and i f

you have any questions or something is unclear, ask the researcher to
c la r ify the item.
Don't be concerned with ranking these options in a rig h t or
correct order.

There is no rig h t or correct order.

terested in how you perceive the options.
sheet out completely.

I am only in 

Be sure to f i l l the record

APPENDIX D
RECORD SHEET FOR
RANKING AND CHOICE DECISIONS
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Record sheet for ranking and choice decisions
Name
RISK:

Please w rite two or three sentences explaining why you
consider these options to be risky (uncertain) for you.

1.
2.
3.
NEUTRAL:

Please w rite two or three sentences explaining why you
consider these options to be neither risky or cautious
fo r you.

1.
2.

3.
CAUTIOUS:

Please w rite two or three sentences explaining why you
consider these options to be cautious (certain) for you.

1.
2.

3.
Please give an indication on the scale below as to how relevant these
options were in your perception of the options available in the given
situation.
relevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 irrelevan t
c irc le one
Do you have some other options which would have been more relevant?
I f so, w rite them on the back of this record sheet.
The option I would prefer under the conditions stated on the
instruction sheet is option ___.
Please w rite two or three sentences explaining why you would prefer
this option i f you were in the situation described.

APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO
THE SUBJECT TAKING THE REP TEST
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In s tru c tio n s given to the subject ta kin g the Rep Test.
I am Duane Pettersen - Course Administrator fo r the 110 sections.
I o rig in a lly developed the course in 1968.
one section per year.

For two years, I offered

With lim ited s ta ff members, we can only o ffe r

eight sections a year and one section during the summer.
Every two or three years, I have trie d to evaluate the 110
course.

What are students learning?

e ffe c t on out-of-class relationships?
effects?

Does what they learn have any
Are there any long-range

Does what one learns in this class have any e ffe c t on other

areas o f learning and other apsects of individual and personal
development?
This quarter, three other s ta ff members are teaching 110 and I
am taking a vacation.

Thus, I f e l t this would be a good quarter for

experimental and controlled course evaluation.
I am asking you as students in INCO 110 to help me and the 110
s ta ff in our continued development and improvement o f the 110 course.
I am asking you to p articip ate by doing three things:
1 -

Complete one form fo r me now during class.

I t w ill take

about a h a lf hour.
2 -

I w ill be giving you a take-home questionnaire to be completed
and returned on Wednesday of this week.
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3 -

Complete some forms for me near the end of th is quarter.
All three 110 sections are participating in this most recent

110 evaluation.

In addition, there is a control group o f students

not involved in 110 this quarter not having ever had 110 in the past.
On these course evaluation forms I w ill be asking for your name.
That is only done in order to be able to correlate the data on a ll
forms.

Once the information is taken o f f your form and put on computer

cards, the original forms with your names w ill be destroyed.
Also your instructor (Barb, Leslie or John) w ill not see your
forms.

The results of the course evaluation w ill be made available

to you i f you so desire.

More details w ill be provided at the end of

the quarter.

Are there any questions about what I'm doing or why?

(Rep Test was given to the students.)
In this form I am looking at relationships which you have with
specific individuals.
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(The directions on the Rep Test were read to the subjects.
subjects were instructed to begin f il l i n g out the Rep Test.

The
A fter

the Rep Test had been completed, the subjects were given a Personal
Orientation Inventory to take home as part of Dr. Pettersen's research.)
In the take-home course evaluation forms, I am looking at a set
of specific evaluations of yourself and others.

This form looks at

your assumptions about yourself and others.
Remember:

there are no rig ht or wrong answers on either of

these course evaluation forms.

Also, the information you put on

these forms is confidential and your instructor w ill not have access
to the information.

APPENDIX F

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN
TO SUBJECTS SORTING OPTIONS
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In s tru c tio n s given to subjects s o rtin g options.
I am David Wheeler.

I am a graduate student in INCO.

For my

thesis, I am investigating the d iffe re n t ways people handle the
same information, p a rtic u la rly when they are going to make a risky
choice or decision.
I am going to need a h a lf hour of your time to rank some options
and make a choice selection fo r me.
number of times to help in research.

I know you have been h it a
I know you are tire d of re

searchers coming into your class and having you f i l l out forms.

I

need your help and to show my appreciation for your help I have
arranged to give those who help me a chit worth 15 cents over at the
UC.

I know i t is not much.

I t is to show you that I would appreciate

your help.
I w ill be asking you to rank order nine options and give your
reasons for the way you ranked them.

Then I am going to ask you to

make a choice of one of the options and give your reasons fo r your
choice.
reasons.

I am interested only in how you rank the options and your
There is no rig h t or wrong way to rank the options.
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Are there any questions as to what I need you to do?

Is

there anyone who does not want to take part in this study?
(The envelopes containing the f ir s t set of options, instructions and
record sheet were distributed to the subjects who volunteered.)
In the envelope you w ill find nine options, a record sheet and
an instruction sheet.

I want you to take a few minutes and read

the instruction sheet and a ll nine options.
Now that you have read the instructions and the options, I
would lik e you to select the three options which you feel are the
most uncertain as to outcome i f you were to take a midterm (class)
using those options.

These are your risky options.

Place these

options on the l e f t side of your desk.
Next select the three options which you feel would provide the
most certainty with regard to outcome i f you were to take a midterm
(class) using these options.

These are your cautious options.

Place

these on the rig h t side of your desk.
The remaining stack of three options are your neutral options.
Leave them in the center of your desk.
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Take the stack on the l e f t side of your desk (the risky options)
and sort these options according to th e ir riskiness.

The ris k ie s t

option of the three w ill be number one and the least risky option
w ill be number 3.

Record this sorting on the record sheet under the

risk category and w rite your reasons fo r these options being risky
for you.
Next, sort the stack on the center of your desk (the neutral
options) according to th e ir riskiness.

The ris k ie s t of the three

options w ill be number 1 and the least risky w ill be number 3.

Record

this sorting on the record sheet under the neutral category and w rite
your reasons for these options being neutral for you.
F in a lly , sort the stack on the rig h t side of your desk (the
cautious options) according to th e ir riskiness.

The ris k ie s t o f the

three options w ill be number 1 and the least risky option w ill be
number 3.

Record this sorting on the record sheet under the cautious

category and w rite your reasons fo r these options being cautious for
you.
Now that you have rank ordered the options, I would lik e you to
select one of the options and give your reasons for selecting that
option.

Also complete a ll of the record sheet.
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When you have completed the record sheet, place the options,
instructions and signed record sheet in the envelope and hand i t in
to me and pick up the second set of options and sort them the same
way you sorted this set of options.

Remember to read the in 

structions, and a ll of the options f i r s t , then sort the options and
f i l l out the record sheet.

Please remember to sign both answer sheets.

When you have completed the second set of options, hand in the
options, instruction sheet and record sheet in the envelope and I
w ill give you the c h it for 15 cents.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.

APPENDIX G
REASONS FOR THE RANKING
OF OPTIONS ON THE MORS
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown followed
by a numerical count on the reasons which were considered in that
category.

These categories w ill be followed by general examples of

the reasons taken from the subjects' records for the MORS.
RISKY REASONS
High IP Don't or can't tru st others
Rejection of group of options
Need for individual reward for individual
e ffo rt

13
9
6

Example statements:
"I don't want to risk a bad grade on people I
don't know."
"You don't know how well you can tru s t others."
"The main reason I rated these risky is the
words 'random s e le c tio n .'"
" I f I chose a group they would be my friends and
we get side tracked."
"(groups are) unfair to certain students because
some w ill end up doing most of the work."
Medium High IP 14
14

Don't or can't depend on others
Rejection of group of options
Example statements:
"You don't know how the others think
a random group would be chaos."
"You could have someone who wouldn't
anything."
"These a ll would be risky because of
work."
"Teacher can grade a subjective test
to personal opinions and feelings."

or a c t,
contribute
the group
according
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Medium Low IP Don't want to depend or tru st others
Reject a group of options
D islike a group of options

12
11
5

Example statements:
"Groups often contain an apathetic member."
"Don't want to work on grade and have someone
ride along."
"I hate to give group presentations, especially
by myself."
"I don't lik e subjective tests."
"I don't feel objective tests are a learning
experience."
"The group potential may be lower than your own
individual one."
Low IP Don't want to depend on others
Rejection of a group of options
L it t le experience with type of te s t.

14
13
4

Example statements:
"Must depend on people involved in te s t, the
chance of a bad p artn er."
"In random group, one person, me, might end up
doing a ll o f the work."
"I have had l i t t l e experience with the te s t."
"You can get stuck with people that won't work,
you wind up doing everything, yet everyone gets the
grade.
NEUTRAL REASONS
High IP
Don't know i f can tru st others
Others might be able to help
A l i t t l e more control
Generally the same as "Risky" options

15
13
9
4
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Example statements:
"The randomly picked ones s lu ff (sic) o ff or
d id n 't do th e ir share, sometimes."
"These items a ll have the uncertainty of group
work."
" I'd be working with people and i t wouldn't be too
hard."
"These options I feel the same as above (ris k y )."
Medium High IP Might get more out o f the option
The way of taking the te st makes i t better.
The type of group (own choosing) better.

14
11
6

Example statements:
"I consider these neither safe or risky because
they are the kinds of situations which could go one
way or the other, but the experience would be neat."
"We might get more knowledge out of the group."
"Subjective test would make a l i t t l e b ette r."
" I t can go good or bad depending on the rest of
the group."
"These are neutral because I consider a subjective
test neutral."
Medium Low IP More people to pool knowledge.
All are the same, in this set.
Cautious of others.

16
12
5

Example statements:
"Because a pool of people can group th e ir knowledge."
"You could possibly pick on the same level as you
are."
"Though I am confident in my a b ilitie s and am
cautious of others."
"2 heads are better than 1 ."
"They a ll seem to have advantages and disadvantages."
"Get ideas brought in that you ju s t d id n 't think
about."
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Low IP The options don't bother subject.
The p o s s ib ility of a l i t t l e more control.
The options are rejected.

15
10
6

Example statements:
"Subjective te s t doesn't bug me."
"These don't make much difference."
" It 's a cop-out."
" I f I can choose the people.. .maybe I can get them
interested enough to help."
"There is at least some control."
"Certain people don't have to function."
CAUTIOUS REASONS
High IP Individual reward fo r individual work.
Control.
Rejection of a group of options.

17
13
9

Example statements:
"People get a grade for th e ir work."
"I lik e working by myself. I have to ta l control."
"You get exactly what you earn."
"In a ll these you are forced to learn the material
y o u rs e lf."
"I'm putting into the te s t, no one else is ."
"None of these involve the element of random
selection."
Medium High IP Individual reward for individual e ffo rt.
Control.
Rejection of a group o f options.
Example statements:
"I would do i t myself except when i t comes to
objective tests."
"You got out the work and get a better grade."
"We'd be able to combine our knowledge with direction
"Any group you pick wouldn't be too bad because
you could control i t . "
" I t is a ll up to you to perform or not."

16
12

5

If
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Individual reward fo r individual e ffo rt.
Rejection of a group of options.
Control.

cr> vjd cn

Medium Low IP 1

Example statements:
"You can le t the instructors know what you know."
"I have confidence in my a b ility ."
"This way you get the grade your deserve."
"I hate presentations."
"I know I can control a group i f I choose the
people."
Low IP
Individual reward for individual
Pooling for knowledge.
Control.

e ffo rt.

Example statements:
"I have confidence in myself as fa r as taking a
test in my major fie ld ."
"The grade is up to me - refle ctin g what I know
about the m aterial."
" I f I am not certain of one thing, the others in the
group can straighten me out."
"I would choose who I work with thus I control the
direction of the group."

16
12
12

APPENDIX H
REASONS FOR THE RANKING
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown followed
by a numerical count on the reasons which were considered in that
category.

These categories w ill be followed by general examples

of the reasons taken from the subjects' records for the CRRS.

RISKY REASONS
High IP Must know the professor.
Can't know what to expect.
Problems with "Staff" options.
Rejection of a group of options.

19
6
6
6

Example statements:
" I f I don't know the professor, i t is harder to
get what he wants you to know."
"S taff members are less well prepared academically."
"I lik e to be fa m ilia r with the professor."
"I re a lly lik e to know the teacher because I can
then determine how they te st and run the class."
"I don't lik e independent study."
Medium High IP Must know the professor.
Rejection of a group of options.
Problems with "Staff" options.

20
14
10

Example statements:
"Because I don't lik e independent study courses."
"Professors are usually more interesting than s ta ff."
" I don't re a lly lik e taking courses - independent
study of lecture - by someone I don't know."
"D islike when "Staff" is w ritten in course c atalo g (s ic )."
" I f I d id n 't know the professor I would be jumping
into something."
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Medium Low IP Must know the professor
Rejection of a group of options.
Problems with "Staff" options.

18
16

9

Example statements:
"When they l i s t s ta ff they are usually trying
to shove t h e _______ of department on you."
"The difference between s ta ff and unknown is
in s ig n ific an t."
"I don't lik e to take classes from s ta ff."
"I prefer unknown professor because I know what to
expect."
"The s ta ff could be someone I knew, but i t could
also be comeone I d is liked ."
Low IP Must know instructor.
Wary of s ta ff classes.
Rejection of a group of options.

16
12
12

Example statements:
"I lik e to know who is teaching classes - - especially
independent study."
"Wary of s ta ff members especially in independent study."
"S taff members generally don't have a rounded out
education enough to be knowledgeable on technical
questions."
"Not knowing who the professor w ill be w ill make
the nature of the class uncertain."
NEUTRAL REASONS
High IP No e x p lic it reasons given.
Can depend oh s e lf.
Know what to expect.

16
5
4

108Example statements:
"Don't know.
"Gut feelin g ."
"When a ll the positive options run out, I ' l l
resort to these."
"Independent study, you are usually on your own."
"I re a lly have no particu lar interest in this s ta ff
teaching in this school."
Medium High IP Not too ris k y , not too safe.
Know what to expect.
Can depend on s e lf.

14
12
10

Example statements:
"These would be in the middle of the road because
they are not too ris k y , but y e t, not as certain as
the ones below."
" I f I know and lik e the instru cto r, I w ill take any
class from him."
" . . . I would have a lo t of control over the
material and get a lo t of feedback."
"Knowing the professor gives more o f an idea of
what to expect and how well you w ill do."
Medium Low IP Known professor.
Feedback in class.
Not risky or cautious.

15
13
10

Example statements:
"I know the professor and what he wants and expects."
"I get more feedback from a discussion class and can
express myself."
"Lecture classes are pretty neutral, no matter who
teaches i t . "
"Pretty well structured, yet some uncertainty."
"The lecture-discussion with an unknown prof would be
a llr ig h t - not great, but not bad."
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Low IP Unknown professor.
Lecture-discussion in terestin g .
Don't lik e lecture.

7
5
5

Example statements:
"Discussion makes i t a b it better in that I get
to know the person better."
"Lecture-discussion has always proved more
interesting and helpful than ju s t lecture."
"I d is lik e straight lecture."
"No real risk in independent study under s ta ff
member but no challenge e ith e r."
"Impartial to s ta ff members, would rather take a
course from a professor."
CAUTIOUS REASONS
High IP Know the professor.
Know what to expect.
Individual control

21

15
6

Example statements:
"I would know what he would lik e and the speed I
would hive to work a t."
"I feel more confident in nearly a ll cases with
professors whom I know."
"In independent courses I feel I can be the instructor."
" I f the teacher is known to you, you have an idea i f
course is interesting or not and what is expected."
"You know what to expect from class and professor."
Medium High IP Known Professor.
Know what to expect.
Individual control

19
15
5

THU
Example statements:
"I know who I am working with and they hopefully
know you."
"I would know the professor and what he/she expects
of me. - a comfortable situ atio n."
"I lik e discussions because can pick up more info
to help on the tests."
"Independent study courses seem cautious because I
would have a lo t of control over the material and get
a lo t of feedback."
"Usually you can find out who is teaching a class
that is lis te d as s ta ff from your Dept. Sec."
Medium Low IP Known Professor.
Know what to expect.
Individual control.

17
13
7

Example statements:
"I know a couple of real good teachers that I
wouldn't mind taking any class from."
"I know the prof and what he wants and expects, and
so I know how to react to him."
"Good situation know what to expect."
"I would feel f a ir ly safe because I would have an
agreement with the supervisor as to what exactly has
to be done."
"How he grades, whether or not I can handle him."
Low IP Known professor.
Individual control.
Know what to expect.
Example statements:
"I lik e to know who the professor is ."
"Know the personality o f instru cto r, what they
want and where they are coming from."
"While doing independent study the course is
e n tire ly in my hands and my grade is not affected
by test scores or curves - ju s t a paper saying
everything I learned."

26
4
4

"You can personally re la te and learn from a prof
you know when doing independent study."
"There is a chance for feedback in class and the
risk is in knowing the professor
"

APPENDIX I
REASONS FOR THE CHOICES
ON THE MORS
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown followed
by a set of sample statements of the reasons given by the particular
IP group.
High IP Individual control.
Perceived a b ility .
Individual reward.

13
12

10

Example statements:
"Because I feel I have the most control."
"I could do my part and have quite a b it of control."
"Each individual should be given the rig h t to his
own grade."
" I f I do good i t is because I deserve i t , i f I do
poorly I have no-one to blame but myself."
"I think in most classes I could do a suitable
presentation."
"I can express myself o ra lly better than on paper."
Medium High IP Individual control.
Can get group help.
Can control the group's direction.
Example statements:
"Because then you could control the grade you
would get." (in a group of own choosing)
"I take mostly essay tests and I am geared to
perform better on them."
"Where I am in doubt I can ask someone else who
knows."
"I could make sure the group got the right answer."

13
10
10
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Medium Low IP
Individual Control.
Better learning.
Pooled knowledge better.

13
10
10

Example statements:
"2 heads are better than one i f I can select the
heads."
"I would rather do a test by myself."
"Can do own work with time to prepare."
"I feel i f I should earn a grade, I should do the
work."
"I could study and be to ta lly prepared."
Low IP Pooled knowledge.
Individual control.
A better learning experience.
Example statements:
"Variety of backgrounds makes class presentation
in random d iffe re n t people w ill work harder to get
something meaningful together."
" I t would represent what I have gotten out of the
class, my own ideas and feelings about the subject
m atter."
" I f I could choose my own group members to partake
in an objective te s t, I would no doubt get an A.
Believe me."

13
12
10
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown
followed by a set of sample statements of the reasons given by
the p articu lar IP group.
High IP Know what to expect.
Know the professor.
Like discussion.

6
3
3

Example statements:
"Because i f I know the professor, I know what is
expected, I can discuss with him better."
"I'm more secure i f I know the instructor."
"You know what is expected and how to deal with
the instructor."
" I f I know the professor I know better what he wants
and what he w ill consider a good worker."
Medium High IP Professor's expectations are known.
Control.
Better learning.
Example statements:
"You can also get involved in the class."
" F irs t, you can fin ish i t up fa s te r, also I
always prefer to know the professor."
" I'd be in control more than in other options."
"I feel you learn more when i t is a lecturediscussion especially by a teacher you know
"
"Obviously i f you know what to expect already from
a professor and from previous experience know you
can do well as you have the advantage of the professor
already knowing you.

5
4
3

11.7
Medium Low IP Professor Is known.
Know what the professor expects.
Better Leaning experience.

8

4
3

Example statements:
"You have good idea of what h e 'll want and how
he te s ts , etc."
"I would get more out of an independent teaching
situ atio n."
"I lik e independent study because I can do the
work on my own time and what I learn or don't learn
depends upon me."
"Under this option I w ill know what to expect
from the class and the instructor. I t helps me to
plan my quarter's work,"
Low IP Professor is known.
Learn more.
Less uncertain or more predictable.
Example statements:
"I am taking an independent class rig h t now and
enjoy i t immensely - I'm learning what I_ want to
learn and not what the teacher wants me to learn."
"I learn more from independent study."
"I learn from some professor because they are
predictable."
"Confident that I would get the most I can from the
class and learn a lo t. This a ll assumes I lik e the
professor and his method of teaching."

4
3
4

